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The knowledge economy requires more people with advanced degrees.
Policies that attach funding to students hold the greatest promise for
increasing both the quantity and quality of graduate education.
Room at the Top: 
Strategies for Increasing the
Number of Graduate Students
in Canada
Education PapersThe Study in Brief
The demands of the new knowledge economy require nations to have increasing numbers of highly skilled
workers, including those with graduate degrees. Expanding graduate education will inevitably be an
expensive proposition, but how would this money be spent best?
On the demand side, modifications have to be made to the student financial aid system and other
bursary/scholarship programs in order to help students pay for their studies and otherwise make graduate
education an attractive proposition, especially for the most qualified candidates and those in the
disciplines that need to draw more students. Changes should include:
• expanding (graduate) student loan eligibility and generally raising loan limits;
￿ increasing grants, scholarships, and bursaries to help make graduate education affordable and
appealing as a career investment;
￿ varying awards by discipline, depending not only on schooling costs, but also outside
employment opportunities and the social (and economic) value of the schooling.
Such measures should look after increasing the demand for graduate school education among qualified
candidates. Policy initiatives on the supply side would, however, also be necessary so that the system can
provide the places required for these extra students.
Traditional measures such as increasing government-to-government or government-to-institution
transfers could be a part of the solution, as would increasing the money available for research. But such
approaches offer few guarantees that the money will be spent in the manner most likely to expand the
system where its quality is greatest.  Nor do they ensure that we have the best graduate education system
possible for the money spent.
Alternative approaches include attaching funding to students directly, and varying the amounts
awarded according to the standing of the student (based on grades, exams and other criteria). Such a
voucher-type system could create incentives for institutions to improve the quality of their programs as
they compete for top students, while also giving them the financial means to expand.
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he economic advantage enjoyed by developed nations is largely rooted in
their stocks of human capital, and if Canada is to be competitive at the
international level it must have highly skilled people who are able to lead
its R&D efforts, pass on its advanced knowledge and skill to the next
generation of students seeking higher education, and otherwise spearhead the
country’s economic dynamism.
It is, however, no longer enough just to expand access to postsecondary
education generally or to increase the number of persons with undergraduate
degrees. With the worldwide growth of higher education in the past two decades,
1
these levels of education no longer give Canada — or indeed any other country —
a sufficient human-capital advantage. Maintaining a competitive position in the
knowledge economy now requires that large numbers of students acquire
advanced degrees.
In its last major policy statement on innovation and competitiveness, Achieving
Excellence, the federal government discussed the importance of higher education
and committed itself to increasing the number of graduate students
2 (in both
master’s and PhD programs) in this country by 5 percent a year through 2010
(Canada 2002b, 60). Other reports, including the recent Rae Review in Ontario,
have sounded similar clarions and have proposed similar goals. Clearly, Canadian
governments are getting the message about the growing importance of advanced
degrees. But the expansion of graduate education poses a number of challenges
that governments — and to a certain extent universities themselves — have yet to
solve or perhaps even fully appreciate.
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referred to as “post-graduate” studies, ie. beyond the first degree level.This paper has four goals. The first is to sketch the very real financial
challenges involved in expanding graduate education. The second is to present a
framework for thinking about the supply of and demand for graduate education
that provides a basis for the ensuing discussions. The third is to discuss the broad
policy levers as well as specific policy initiatives that might allow us to increase
the number of graduate students as effectively and efficiently as possible. The
fourth and final goal is to outline some of the related policy implications of
expanding graduate education, particularly as they pertain to teaching and
learning at both the graduate and undergraduate levels.
At the heart of the paper is a simple demand-supply analytical framework that
provides a useful basis for considering the factors that determine the number and
quality of graduate students. One of the implications of this framework is that
policies will be needed on both sides of the graduate student equation: measures
to expand the capacity of the system as well as greater incentives for more (and
perhaps different) people to enrol. The importance of the supply-side factors
means, in particular, that offering more graduate scholarships and bursaries, as the
federal government did in its 2003 budget, is unlikely to get the job done on its
own. The more difficult and central task, in fact, is to increase capacity.
One possible means of achieving the expansion proposed here is essentially to
attach graduate school funding to meritorious qualified students, who will then
take that funding with them to their institutions and programs of choice and thus
provide the means for expanding the system where it will best serve students —
and society.
While such an approach would imply various design challenges, it is also quite
practical and could be put into place fairly quickly and efficiently by using
existing structures that award scholarships on the basis of students’ merit. In this
way, the proposed system would incorporate the much-vaunted benefits of the
“single-payer“ approach that generates such efficiencies for our public health
system, and yet at the same time open up the “market“ for graduate education
and thus serve the goals of more and better schooling with improved efficiency. In
short, such an approach should allow the system to create the best possible
graduate programs of the desired size for the money invested.
The Cost of Expanding Graduate Education
Before we turn to discussions of policy mechanisms for increasing the number of
students pursuing advanced degrees, it is worth stopping to consider the size of
the sector we are discussing and the likely financial cost of expanding it.
The most recent statistics show that there are 148,000 graduate students in
Canada, of whom 71 percent are full-time and 29 percent are part-time. Men are
slightly more numerous among doctoral students and full-time students; women
predominate among master’s level and part-time students (Statistics Canada
2006). Roughly 74 percent of graduate students are studying at the master’s level;
the rest are studying at the doctoral level (CAGS 2005). Quebec has 30 percent of
all Canadian graduate students, which is a disproportionately high number since
it has only about one-quarter of the country’s university students at all levels. 
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lumped together, it is instructive to note the very large differences in
concentrations of enrolments by field of study at the two levels. At the master’s
level, the largest fields of study are business and administration (25 percent of all
enrolment), engineering (15 percent), social sciences (13 percent), and education
(12 percent). At the doctoral level, the largest fields of study are physical and life
sciences (22 percent of all enrolment), social sciences (20 percent), engineering (16
percent), and the humanities (12 percent) (CAGS 2005).
The cost of this education is highly variable; there is no single set cost of
educating a student at any particular level or in any particular place. The cost
depends on such things as instructors’ salaries, teacher-student ratios, and the
intensity of capital inputs, such as building construction and maintenance, IT
infrastructure, and library acquisitions. Significant differences between institutions
or jurisdictions — or changes (over time) — in these inputs will alter per-student
costs. Of course fundamental to variations in cost are differences in quality, but
efficiency also counts, and cost is not necessarily a direct indicator of quality.
At the global level, there are countries (in much of Asia and East Africa) where
the cost of educating an undergraduate student is about $1,000 a year, whereas in
the OECD countries the average is over $10,000, and in elite private colleges and
universities in the United States it is $30,000 or even higher (Usher 2005). In
Canada, the amount of per-student funding varies significantly from province to
province. A recent publication by the Canadian Policy Research Networks
calculates that per-student funding from all sources ranges from $14,300 in New
Brunswick to over $35,000 in British Columbia (Snowdon 2006). The average per-
student funding is calculated to be about $23,000.
All observers agree that it costs more to educate graduate students than
undergraduate students because more advanced students require greater contact
with their professors and greater access to equipment, laboratories, and other
resources. How much more depends on the institution, the field of study, and the
level of study, with doctoral students generally needing more resources than
master’s students. Although there are no Canadian studies on costs per student,
certain rules of thumb are embodied in provincial funding formulas. Ontario, for
instance (which has one of the more explicit and sophisticated funding models)
funds master’s students at anywhere between 1.5 and 3 times the level of
undergraduate students, depending once again on the field of study, and PhD
students at between 3 and 6 times the level of undergraduate students (Ontario
2003). Assuming that these kinds of funding ratios bear some relationship to
actual costs, an increase in the number of graduate students will create a much
greater burden for universities than would a similar increase in the number of
undergraduate students.
Imagine for a moment that graduate enrolment were to increase by 7 percent a
year. This may seem large (and indeed, it is more than some government targets),
but even that rate of increase, sustained for a decade, would still leave Canada
trailing the United States in the proportion of graduate students. Such a rate of
growth does not even seem particularly large when compared to recent trends:
over the period 1999/2000 to 2004/05, graduate enrolment rose by 28 percent, or a
simple average of about 5.6 percent a year — which was far ahead of the average
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that is significantly inflated by the distorting effects of Ontario’s double cohort
(Statistics Canada 2006).
Such an increase would lead to a doubling of graduate students in 10 years, to
just under 300,000. Assuming, on the basis of the Ontario funding numbers, that
on average one graduate student costs 2.5 times as much as an undergraduate,
then the cost of doubling graduate numbers would be roughly equal to the cost of
adding 375,000 undergraduates to the country’s colleges and universities. To put it
another way, it would be almost like adding the equivalent of another Ontario to
the national system of postsecondary education. To put this in perspective, the
collective operating budgets of Ontario universities now total about $5 billion a
year (Council of Ontario Universities 2006).
This is, of course, a large sum of money and not one that will be easily borne
by the public purse (even if it pales somewhat in comparison to recent increases in
health care costs). The costs could be reduced somewhat by changes in instruction
methods and could to at least some extent be defrayed by higher tuition fees.
Neither of these two alternatives is problem-free, however, and we will turn to the
secondary policy challenges posed by each one later in this paper. 
For now, having established the financial context of the policies being
discussed, let us concentrate on the first challenge of how we might attract and
keep substantial numbers of new graduate students in Canadian universities in
the years to come.
An Analytical Framework
This section presents a relatively simple demand-supply framework that is useful
for thinking about the number and “quality“ of graduate students in Canada and
how these two underlying factors could be influenced by various policy measures.
It first develops each of the demand-and-supply concepts individually, and then
puts them together with a stylized treatment of tuition policies to portray an
equilibrium that identifies the number and certain characteristics of students in the
system.
Despite its simplicity, the framework helps to clarify a number of important
practical issues. In particular, it emphasizes the importance of the supply side of
the system as much as the demand side — in other words, the need not only to
encourage students to pursue graduate studies, but to ensure there are enough
places for them. The development of this framework sets the stage for the
following sections, which deal with specific policies that could be used to increase
the numbers and quality of graduate students in Canada. That said, some readers
may wish to go straight to the policy discussions that follow — even though those
discussions depend on the material presented here.
The Demand for Graduate Education
The demand for graduate education may be defined as representing the number of
qualified people who (i) would like to pursue studies at this level, and (ii) are able
to do so in that they can afford the tuition fees and living costs during their
studies and can overcome other potential barriers. The classic demand “curve“
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“consumers.“ In this case, demand can be thought of as the number of places
sought in graduate schools at any given level of tuition fees. 
The demand curve for graduate education — like virtually all demand curves
— would be expected to have a negative slope, meaning that at higher tuition
levels, fewer people would want to pursue higher studies or have the means to do
so, and vice versa. This is for two general reasons. First, a higher price reduces the
rate of return to schooling because of the increased costs of the investment
represented by the higher fees, so that some people will no longer wish to attend;
and second, a higher price also makes it more difficult for some individuals to
afford attendance.
Given these fundamental characteristics of the price-demand relationship for
graduate education, its specific form and position will be affected by the various
factors that determine demand at any given price. An appreciation of some of the
most important of these is useful for understanding “the market for graduate
education“ — or, in terms of the issue at hand, for identifying measures that could
increase the number of people who are willing, and able, to pursue graduate
studies.
Broadly, four sets of factors influence the demand for education, which are
now considered in turn.
Labour Market Opportunities
To the extent that graduate studies improve a person’s lifetime earnings or
otherwise lead to desirable jobs, this should increase the demand for graduate
education.
3 A related, shorter-run labour market influence on graduate-school
attendance is the immediate availability of jobs for those who choose not to
continue with their studies. When unemployment declines, for example, the
demand for postsecondary education tends to decrease, since the opportunity cost
of going to school in terms of the alternative uses of individuals’ time (earning
money in a job) falls, and this dynamic appears to hold at the graduate level as
elsewhere.
4
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3 It is important to recognize that the private returns to graduate education, at the PhD level in
particular, are often estimated to be low, or even negative, at least in some fields (e.g., see
Vaillancourt and Bourdeau-Primeau 2002). One reason is that the future job benefits often come
in non-monetary forms, such as the greater independence enjoyed by people with graduate
degrees, the rewards from doing research, often of one’s own choosing, and other such
advantages. But even if the private benefits of going to graduate school are relatively low in
financial terms, anything that affects the labour-market opportunities for those with graduate
degrees will affect the demand for graduate education. In short, regardless of the prevailing
situation, any improvement in future job opportunities for people with graduate degrees should
increase the demand for graduate school.
4 See Finnie (2004b) for evidence that going to graduate school appears to vary inversely with
prevailing macro conditions: that is, when the economy slows down (and unemployment rises),
attendance increases, and vice versa. This leads to speculation as to what sort of people tend to
enrol in graduate school as job opportunities decline: perhaps it is those who have not succeeded
in finding or keeping a good job after graduating with a first (or second) degree rather than those
who would make the best graduate students per se and would then go on to have the most
productive careers with those higher levels of education.Affordability and Student Financial Aid
No amount of demand for graduate education will be effective — even for those
for whom it might be a good investment in terms of career earnings and the other
benefits it provides — unless the person is able to pay the tuition fees and other
direct costs and cover his or her living expenses while in school. For this reason,
student financial aid in all its forms is a primary policy tool for influencing the
demand for graduate education, and it will therefore figure prominently in the
discussions to follow.
The Nature of the Educational Experience
Another set of factors that determine the demand for graduate education pertains
to the quality of the programs offered. This can be thought of in two ways. First,
are graduate programs good at imparting the knowledge and skills that will prove
useful in a person’s subsequent career or otherwise make graduate school a
worthwhile investment? And second, is the schooling an inherently positive and
enjoyable experience for students? The more these questions can be answered in
the affirmative, the greater will be the demand for graduate education.
Awareness and Preparation
The more students are aware of the benefits of graduate education, the greater will
be the demand for it. Similarly, to the extent that students considering graduate
level education are better prepared to succeed in and benefit from such programs,
the greater should be the demand for it.
The Supply Side
It is difficult to describe precisely the supply of postsecondary education in
Canada because of the diversity of systems operating across the country —
diversity resulting from the fact that postsecondary education, unlike in many
other countries, is constitutionally a provincial matter. It is, however, possible to
describe the essential elements of the system in a way that is useful to this
analytical framework and, ultimately, to the policy issues addressed here.
The postsecondary system in Canada may be considered to have a classic
upwards-sloping supply curve, which represents a situation where higher prices
— in this case the tuition fees paid by students (thus corresponding to the price
concept used on the demand side) — result in more places being offered. In short,
higher tuition fees make it feasible and worthwhile for universities to expand their
capacity.
The shape and position of the supply curve is determined by two main factors.
Core Funding
In addition to receiving a certain share of the tuition fees taken in (depending on
the particular jurisdiction’s funding formula), universities receive various kinds of
6 C.D. Howe Institute Commentarycore funding from their provincial governments.
5 Generally, the greater the core
funding for institutions, the more able they are to expand their graduate-student
capacity.
The effect of increasing core funding can be thought of as shifting the supply
curve outward: that is, increasing the number of places available for graduate
students in the system at any given price (tuition fee).
Research Funding
The resources available for research represent another important determinant of
the supply of graduate student places, since the two activities — research and
graduate education — are significantly related. To the extent that a graduate
degree involves research, the more abundant the resources available for research at
a university, the greater the number of students that can be trained. Increasing
research funding can again be considered as causing the supply curve for graduate
education to move outward.
Equilibrium, Supply, and Demand
The Basic Equilibrium
Demand and supply can now be put together to show a typical “equilibrium“
situation for graduate education. Figure 1 shows the sort of upward-sloping
supply curve and downward-sloping demand curve just discussed. It also shows
tuition fees as an exogenous given, as represented by the horizontal line at P,
corresponding to the standard situation in Canada, where fees are generally set by
provincial education ministries rather than by individual institutions in response
to market forces. The number of places for graduate students that institutions are
willing and able to supply is represented by the point where the price intersects
the supply curve, or NS. The demand for places on the part of applicants is
represented by the point where the price intersects the demand curve, or ND.
As drawn, the figure shows what is probably the typical situation in Canada,
where at prevailing fee levels, demand is greater than supply (ND > NS); that is,
there are more people who would like to go to graduate school than there are
places.
6
We will now consider how changes to various underlying factors that
determine the shape and position of the demand and supply curves will affect the
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5 Provinces receive a certain amount of funding for these purposes from the federal government
through the Canada Social Transfer (CST), though in the last federal election the three national
parties all promised to create a separate transfer specifically for postsecondary education.
6 In some provinces, tuition fees are not regulated, or at least can be set by the institutions within a
certain range. Supply, though, is usually controlled in one fashion or another, and there is usually
excess demand. The framework presented here thus provides at least a good starting point for
thinking about the number of students, their characteristics, and the effects of changing any of
the factors that affect supply and demand.number of students in the system and their characteristics with respect to financial
need and ability.
The Effects of Increasing Student Financial Aid
Consider, first, an increase in student financial aid (such as grants or scholarships),
which is the most common suggestion when there is talk of increasing the number
of graduate students.
An increase in the financial support available to graduate students will shift
the demand curve for graduate school to the right — from D0 to D1 as shown in
Figure 2. This will occur for the two reasons previously discussed: (i) some of
those who receive the assistance will thus acquire the means of going to graduate
school, and (ii) for those who receive assistance, the reduction in schooling costs
will make the investment more worthwhile. Thus, the number of places sought at
the prevailing fee levels increases to ND1.
There will, however, not be any change in supply, which remains at NS,
precisely because tuition fees have not changed, meaning that — again in the
absence of any other supply-side changes (such as more core funding or research
money available) — universities will not have the additional money required to
pay for a general expansion and, therefore, will not grow. Since the number of
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NS NDplaces in the system remains unchanged, the number of students will not change
either, remaining at NS.
This is a simple but very important finding. That is, an increase in aid for
graduate students, and thus in the demand for graduate education, will not
generally change the number of students. It may change the kind of students who
are in the system. For example, there should be higher participation among the
pool of students receiving the increased aid, who will crowd out others. But if
graduate schools are already operating at capacity, they will generally not create
additional places. Expanding their capacity would require an increase in tuition
fees, changes in other elements of the funding formulas, or some other change in
the resources they have available.
Changes in Other Demand-Side Factors
A change in demand stemming from any of the other underlying factors discussed
above — higher labour-market returns to graduate school, an improvement in the
quality of education offered, and so on — would have effects similar to an increase
in student financial aid in terms of the number of graduate students. The
characteristics of the student body might again change, but overall numbers
would not change.
The exception to this rule is where the system is not constrained by its capacity
and where the number of places outstrips the number of good candidates. The
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Excess Demand at D0
ND0 ND1 NS
Number of Students
Note: The figure shows the importance of the unchanged tuition fee levels, which mean that the incentive to
admit more students at the margin has not changed — even as more students would like to attend.effect of increasing demand in such circumstances is shown in Figure 3. In such




The model presented here suggests that governments would generally have to
take supply-side measures to cause the number of graduate students to rise.
The effects of measures that would increase universities’ capacity for graduate
students can be represented by the outward shift in the supply curve from S0 to S1
in Figure 4. Such an expansion could come from increases in per capita funding
formulas, from larger block grants, or from any other change that essentially made
it possible for institutions to admit a greater number of graduate students.
With such a shift in the supply curve, the number supplied at prevailing
tuition fees (P) would increase from NS0 to NS1. In the absence of any change in
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7 This would indeed appear to be the situation in at least certain disciplines, at certain schools.
Engineering seems to be a good case in point: at least some universities are crying for good
candidates, but it is not worthwhile for many of the best potential students to attend since they
can have very good careers without a higher degree. More generous student assistance could, of
course, improve this situation, as will be discussed below.







QD1 QDS QD0tuition fees or in any other underlying demand-side factors, demand would
remain at the same level as before (ND). There would be, as a result, an increase in
the number of students in the system as institutions admitted more people to fill
the greater number of places now available. The characteristics of the student
body would (as with the demand-side changes) also change, depending on the
composition of those admitted due to the expansion (ie. the “marginal” students
who now gain places in graduate schools).
Policy Options
What are the policy options for increasing the number of graduate students in this
country, and ideally, for increasing the numbers where the resulting quality of
education is likely to be greatest? The following discussion considers first those
initiatives that would operate on the demand side, and then those that would
affect the supply side.
Demand-side Options
Labour-Market Returns to Graduate Education
Any measures that increased the labour-market returns to graduate education
should lead to greater demand for this level of schooling. These returns, however,
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Number of Studentsare but one outcome of the entire economic system and are thus generally difficult
to affect in isolation. It can be argued that the entire Canadian economy needs to
be made more technologically and research-oriented (Lavoie and Finnie 1999), and
presumably that would improve the labour outcomes of higher-level university
graduates. But this takes us into broader policy issues that lie beyond the specific
scope of this paper. Suppose instead that we take the economic system as more or
less given; what can we do inside of these bounds to increase the labour market
outcomes of master’s and PhD graduates, make such an education more attractive,
and thus potentially lead to an expansion from the demand side?
Straightforward earnings subsidies for upper-level graduates would be
possible, but such measures would likely be less efficient than other more targeted
initiatives and might be quite controversial since graduates tend to have relatively
high earnings to start with, and the rates of return at the master’s level, in
particular, are already quite high (as previously discussed).
One common suggestion regarding the doctoral level is to increase the number
of postdoctoral fellowships available in order to help graduates get a good start in
the labour market and go on to productive and rewarding careers. Other narrowly
career-related interventions of this type — as opposed to, say, earnings subsidies
(or tax breaks) — might be possible.
Finally, it is important to note that while labour-market outcomes undoubtedly
help to determine the demand for graduate studies, incentives for students do not
necessarily need to be related to the labour market. Human capital theory teaches
that investments are based on the net returns to a given investment, which is
partly based on cost. It is to issues of costs and related subsidies that we now turn.
Affordability and Student Financial Aid
Tuition fees for graduate studies are currently at reasonable rates and should
probably not be lowered for various reaons, including important equity and
efficiency considerations. Nor do we wish to get into the debate regarding what
levels fees should be. That leaves us to focus our concerns regarding affordability
and the need for improved financial incentives for going on to graduate school on
student assistance.
Student assistance may (as previously discussed) have two kinds of effects on
the demand for graduate school. First, it can make the schooling more affordable.
Secondly, it can raise the rate of return to education and, hence, make the
education more worthwhile for students. 
In so far as there is insufficient demand for graduate education because it is
not affordable for some, student loans are one obvious remedy. An expanded loan
system for graduate students with wider eligibility and higher borrowing limits
should, therefore, be put in place to ensure that all those who want to go to
graduate school and who qualify for established programs are able to do so. 
In so far as the demand problem is due to inadequate rates of return — which
is probably more likely at the doctoral level than at the master’s level — then
grants, bursaries, scholarships, and other forms of non-repayable support should
be considered (as indeed they have been in the new Canada Graduate
Scholarships).
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loans should be made available on a relatively uniform basis, while reflecting
differences in costs among different disciplines, levels, or places of study,
scholarships (and other non-repayable forms of support) should in general not be
so uniform. In fact, where possible, these subsidies should be awarded on a field-
by-field, or at least faculty-by-faculty basis that recognizes the different
circumstances that characterize the different areas of study.
For example, it may be difficult to attract worthy candidates to certain
disciplines because of the high starting wages for those with only undergraduate
degrees. In that case, stipends of one sort or another (or scholarships or some
other such kind of non-repayable financial assistance) might be needed to attract
students into graduate studies in those disciplines. Alternatively, if the external or
social benefits of a particular discipline are deemed to be substantially higher than
in other disciplines, higher awards might again be helpful — above and beyond
what is needed simply to make the schooling affordable. In either case, the
underlying strategy is the same: to make the schooling more attractive to a greater
number of qualified candidates.
In general, if we think of student financial aid only in terms of it being
sufficient to make the schooling affordable, we might not give as much assistance
as is needed in disciplines where (i) it is difficult to attract students because they
enjoy attractive labour market opportunities without going on to graduate school;
or (ii) where there are other conditions which impinge on the number of
individuals wanting to pursue graduate level — whether or not it is affordable.
A good case in point is the current situation in Alberta, where the labour
market is so overheated that the opportunity costs of graduate school in terms of
foregone labour market earnings are very high. Another is engineering more
generally, a field where undergraduates (or master’s-level graduates) can have
productive and well-paying careers, these careers thus offering relatively stiff
competition to graduate programs, especially at the doctoral level. Similar
situations are found in other disciplines and jurisdictions. In short, if students are
to be attracted to graduate studies, the enticements will — among other factors —
have to be sufficient, and the financial aid system has a key role to play in this
dynamic.
Such a differential award policy might raise cries of unfairness, which would
would be correct only if we interpret different as unfair. But if the goal is to devise
policies that will attract greater numbers of high-quality candidates to graduate
school where it is important (and difficult) to do so, such a flexible, asymmetric
approach to award levels would be required. To some extent, such a system
already exists, for the awards from the various granting agencies already vary
considerably. This flexibility need only be further built upon.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to specify the precise number, form, and
value of financial awards that should be offered to help make graduate school not
only affordable, but also attractive in relation to students’ other possible activities.
Only further empirical research and consultations with representatives of the
various interested parties — graduate schools, student groups, employer
associations, and so on — can do this. It is, however, worth raising one specific
issue that should figure in this discussion: namely, the simplification of the system
of financial support for graduate students.
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as well, for that matter — is extensive and complex. Financial support comes in
the form of scholarships, bursaries, grants, research and teaching assistantships,
loans, tuition remission, tax credits, debt remission, and more. Some is based on
merit; that is, on marks, awards, and other such criteria. Some, including many
grants and all government student loans, is determined principally according to
need (as long as the person is in an eligible program). Some, such as tax credits, is
totally untargeted, being based on neither need nor merit. The sources are also
varied: aid is available from the major federal granting agencies (the NSERC, the
SSHRC, and the CIHR), provincial education ministries, universities themselves,
federal and provincial loan programs, research projects, and other federal,
provincial, and other sources.
These complexities and resulting inefficiencies of the current financial-aid
system create high transaction costs, leave students with considerable uncertainty
about funding until the last minute, and perhaps most important, do not ensure
that the money goes where it is most needed or is otherwise put to best use.
8 A
complete and thorough overhaul of student assistance would undoubtedly help to
ensure that the system delivered money in the most equitable, efficient, and
effective manner.
The Nature of the Educational Experience
Any improvement in the quality of teaching or the educational experience
generally would normally increase the demand for the schooling offered, resulting
in more and better applicants as graduate education became more rewarding and
more enjoyable. Yet, while universities generally try to provide the best programs
possible with the resources at their disposal, there is almost certainly room for
improvement in many situations.
And yet the means by which governments can directly effect improvements in
the quality of the educational experience are extremely limited and usually they
are left with few options but to pump in more money and wish for the best.
Sometimes this may work, but it is a generally unsatisfactory approach. Indeed,
the best hope we have of creating improvements on this front is probably to put
more power in the hands of the students themselves — a topic to which we return
below.
Preparedness, Awareness, and Preferences
There are probably a good number of simple, relatively low-cost measures that
could improve the preparedness for, awareness of, and preference for graduate
school among undergraduates that would in turn increase the demand for upper-
level studies. For example, more “think-about-graduate-school-as-a-career-option“
sessions could be held for undergraduates — or those held made more effective —
so that students gained more early exposure to the idea of going to graduate
school and even planned their undergraduate careers with that goal in mind.
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8 See Finnie, Usher, and Vossensteyn (2004) for a description of the different forms and sources of
student financial aid at all levels of postsecondary education, as well as a proposal for reform.Another idea would be to establish programs that gave undergraduates hands-
on research experience, thus helping to prepare them for graduate school and
perhaps allowing them to find out at an early stage whether the sort of research
career this might prepare them for was something that might appeal to them.
These are, of course, merely sketches of examples to illustrate the sort of
initiatives that might be tried. Any actual programs should be based on an
examination of the areas of greatest need and an assessment of the sorts of
programs that have proved most effective in the past.
Conclusions about Improving Demand-side 
Factors in Graduate Education
Having discussed these various policy levers, it should be noted that we don’t
currently know very much about the relative importance of these different factors
in affecting the demand for graduate school. How many good potential candidates
are deterred by the costs or are simply unable to afford to go? How many have the
means to attend but choose not to because they do not consider the long-run
career opportunities to be worth the investment? How many have the money and
are attracted by the jobs options that would result but are dissuaded by the
graduate school experience itself? How many aren’t sufficiently well prepared or
haven’t made the effort to enter graduate school because they have not been
exposed to what graduate school offers or do not understand what is required of
them if they want to be accepted into the sort of program they would like?
In order to develop the right policy response, it would obviously be helpful to
know the answers to these and related questions. Such knowledge would allow us
to use judiciously the policy instruments best suited to removing each particular
impediment to graduate school attendance. Therefore, an early step in the
development of any policy for increasing graduate school enrolment should
probably be to obtain information on the barriers to graduate level schooling
through a good national student survey and other kinds of analysis with this goal.
Supply-side Measures
Increased Transfers to Institutions
If capacity is to expand significantly, universities will need more money, and given
the existing fiscal structures, at least some of that money would normally come
from the federal government in the form of block transfers to the provinces (as
part of the CST or otherwise). The obvious problem is that even if the federal
government increased those transfers, the money would henceforth be under the
control of individual provinces, which, through their ministries of education,
subsequently transfer funds to individual institutions. In other words, for federal
block grants to have any purpose, provincial governments would also have to
make graduate education a priority and ensure that all additional federal dollars
were added to the pre-existing levels of graduate school funding.
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they could best facilitate growth in graduate education at the system or institution
level, and perhaps a federal-provincial set of agreements could highlight the need
for such spending and provide for as many controls as possible to make sure the
money went where it were supposed to. However, since one dollar is
interchangeable with another and government budgets are constantly in a state of
flux, the notion that specific pots of money can be precisely identified and directed
in this manner strains one’s credulity.
Even if such an accord were to emerge or the funds were otherwise transferred
to the institutions, there would be the problem of ensuring that the money was
spent on graduate education rather than on undergraduate education (or was not
simply used for professors’ salaries or other cost increases). This problem is
especially pertinent where there is such overlapping of universities’ functions (for
example, the same professors, buildings, and equipment are generally involved in
each of its activities) that spending can never be specifically attributed to one
particular purpose rather than another. Again, systems of agreements between,
say, provincial authorities and specific institutions or their representative bodies
could help ensure that the money went primarily where it was intended. But again
it would be difficult to monitor or enforce such agreements, and slippage would
undoubtedly occur.
If money were transferred directly from the federal government to educational
institutions, as was the practice in the late 1950s and early 1960s, one source of
money slippage might be prevented (that is, the provinces could not spend the
money in other areas). However, there would still be no control over how the
institutions spend the money. Furthermore, since the federal government is not
responsible for the general operation of universities, the provinces would likely
balk at such an intrusion into their jurisdiction.
The fundamental problem is one of incentives. Block grants — from one level
of government to another or from governments to institutions — simply do not
provide a sufficiently targeted set of incentives to ensure that individual
institutions, or the system in total, grow in a way that is aligned with the
government’s goal of increasing the quantity and maintaining the best possible
quality of graduate education.
Attaching Money to Students
An alternative approach would be to attach money to graduate students
themselves — a measure that could be adopted by the federal government, the
provinces, or both. With such a system, students could arrive at their programs of
choice with what amounted to vouchers that their chosen institutions could
redeem for cash payments. From a federal point of view, this might be an ideal
solution since payments to individuals are a recognized use of the federal
spending power, even in areas that are ostensibly within provincial jurisdiction.
9
One significant advantage of such an arrangement is that it would get the
money immediately and directly to where it was needed to expand the graduate
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9 That is indeed the case with the Canada Student Loans Program and the Canada Millennium
Scholarship Foundation, neither of which has ever been legally challenged as unconstitutional. ...education system — the institutions themselves. And in so far as such transfers
were given to students holding scholarships, bursaries, or other awards, the
demand and supply problems could be largely solved at the same time. The
demand-side problem of access for graduate education would be solved as
students received financial assistance, and the means of increasing the supply of
places would be provided to institutions via the resources they received through
students.
The growth of the system would be facilitated by targeting more money of
both sorts, at least mostly on the same individuals, using roughly the same
(existing) mechanisms for determining both students’ awards and institutions’
transfers. And since students could generally be counted upon to choose the best
programs for themselves, the money would in general go to the generally superior
programs, where growth would presumably be most desired.
One potential objection to this kind of direct-to-student funding scheme is that
it could create instability in institutional finances and preclude the kind of long-
term planning facilitated by block grants, but in the case of graduate funding that
objection is only partly valid. First of all, block grants would still presumably exist
for capital expenditures and undergraduate education and even for a share of
graduate student funding (depending on the degree to which the proposed
scheme was added to existing structures or came to replace them more fully), thus
giving institutions a very large base upon which to build. Second, most existing
block grant transfers are to some extent dependent on student numbers (in
Ontario and Quebec student enrolment figures are put directly into the funding
equation); so changing the method of linking funds to students from an indirect
link to a direct one would not necessarily alter institutional budgeting processes a
great deal. Third, because of the length of graduate programs (especially at the
doctorate level), enrolment is unlikely to fluctuate very much from year to year.
And finally, the size of any particular graduate program is generally quite stable
from one year to the next because whatever attracted students in one year is likely
to attract approximately the same number in another year. In short, programs
could more or less count on receiving a certain amount in student-attached
transfers on the basis of past enrolment, and they could plan — and spend —
accordingly.
Another objection might be based on a skepticism that putting money in the
hands of users (in this case students) necessarily makes a system more responsive
— or otherwise responsive in the right ways.
10 Supporters of the kind of system
we propose would argue that it would give institutions greater incentives to
attract students, and that they presumably could do that only by offering high-
quality programs. As a result, a desirable set of incentives regarding the quality of
graduate school programs should prevail.
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... Moreover, to the extent that graduate students are related to "research," such payments may be
seen as constitutionally benign, since provincial governments have conceded to federal
governments the right to make payments in support of research through mechanisms such as the
federal granting councils and, more recently, to cover the indirect costs of research.
10 See, for instance, Laidler (2005) or Pakravan (2006) for the application of the consumer-choice
model as applied to postsecondary education more broadly, including undergraduate education.Professors who were good teachers and good advisers would, for example,
become more valuable and perhaps be better rewarded in terms of tenure
decisions, salaries, and in other ways. Departments that were successful in
attracting transfer-bearing graduate students would be similarly valued within
their institutions and could be expected to receive more resources than others that
were not. Universities as a whole that were able to attract students and the funds
that went with them might become more favoured within each provincial system.
In short, students would bring in money, quality would attract students, and so
the incentive structure would be to provide quality schooling in order to attract
quality students.
One valid rebuttal could be made here. Once a graduate student had enrolled
in a university, the institution could still simply pocket the money and invest it
wherever it liked. And to the extent that the supply of graduate student places
was limited, and students were lining up to get in, institutions would not
necessarily need to invest in quality, but merely in quantity to get more students
— and more money. Hence, at least some of the vaunted benefits of competition
might not be realized. 
If we were, however, to vary the size of the voucher (or at least some
vouchers) according to merit and make such “preferred“ vouchers large enough,
institutions would have an additional incentive to provide high quality education
in order to pursue the more “lucrative“ students. They might not be quite as keen
to pursue less-funded students, but these students would still benefit from the
school’s quality improvements and would in any event find themselves a place in
the program if the funds were sufficient to accommodate them. The design details
of this system would be important to achieving the desired incentive structures,
but well-working systems can at least be imagined.
In short, capacity increases and improvements in the quality of graduate
programs, should result from a happy convergence of well-designed incentives:
professors, departments, and institutions like to attract better students for their
own sake, since they make teaching more interesting, result in higher-quality
research (as students act as research assistants and junior colleagues), and enhance
the institutions’ reputation; but better students would also attract more money;
and students — “top-quality“ and otherwise — would bring with them the
financing required to pay for the graduate-program places they occupy.
One of the main challenges of designing such a system would be the choice of
means used to decide the size of the subsidy attached to each student. In Russia’s
Government Individual Finance Obligations (GIFO) system, the size of the
voucher is based on the student’s results in a high-stakes, high-security
standardized test (which is necessary because more local and less standardized
methods of assessment are vulnerable to bribery and corruption).
11 Such a method
could be used in Canada as well — Graduate Record Exams (GREs) are already
widely employed here, and this exam or something like it could easily be pressed
into service for this purpose. But it is not the only possible option. Large-scale
exercises in evaluating students’ merit are in fact already carried out in order to
award the scholarships provided by the national granting agencies (such as the
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11 See Smolentseva (2005).SSHRC, the NSERC, and the CIHR), as well as their provincial counterparts, as
well of course as by the institutions themselves when they are deciding which
students to accept, so the issue would be one of scale and of adapting such
existing evaluation systems to this particular purpose rather than inventing a new
system.
Another design issue pertains to where exactly the transfers should go: to the
particular department, to the associated graduate school, to the university as a
whole, and so on. This would not, however, necessarily be as important an issue
as might appear. Departments that attracted students bearing such transfers
should, because of the incentive effects just enumerated, ultimately receive at least
a good share of the funds brought in even if they went first to a higher level of the
institution (for example, the faculty or graduate school or even above this). It
would make little sense for institutions not to support the departments or faculties
that were successful in bringing in such transfers because this would diminish the
department’s or faculty’s ability to continue to bring in additional transfers.
A final design issue pertains to the size of the relevant transfers, including any
differences by discipline that might be appropriate, such as those related to how
expensive programs are to run. But this is a matter of design detail, not a
fundamental barrier to adopting such a system. Again, since decisions are already
being made in this regard across the postsecondary-education system, it would be
a matter of adapting what is already known and done.
12
In short, an intelligently structured set of transfers to universities based on the
number of highly qualified graduate students they had enrolled should create new
incentives for offering high-quality graduate education, and the resources brought
into the institution as a result could then help expand the system precisely where
the quality was best — that is, where students chose to attend. Students, who are
presumably in the position to judge program quality and who have the incentives
to enrol in the best programs they can, would themselves direct the funds towards
the higher-quality programs. It would be a market-type solution, with market-type
efficiencies, even though it would be conducted entirely with public money.
Universities and faculty associations might object to such a proposal because it
would essentially shift power from them to students. They would become more
accountable to the interests they are meant to serve rather than having the leeway
to do what they like, with the essentially blank cheques they are currently given.
“Give us the money and we’ll do the job“ is their popular refrain. But surely it’s
sensible to make those transfers dependent on the quality of the education
provided so as to get the best results possible from the money. Moreover, this
proposal would in no way limit an institution’s freedom to improve quality in the
way it thought most appropriate, and indeed could encourage a great deal of
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12 Another possible difficulty with such a system is that institutions might be tempted to increase
financial awards to individual students in order to attract those who brought transfers with them,
which could result in a significant amount of the transfers being competed away, leaving the
institutions with a diminished net transfer while students benefited. For example, if a student
brought a transfer of, say $10,000, an institution would be tempted to essentially use some of that
$10,000 to attract the student. This money would then go towards the student rather than the
institution itself, as intended. Certain rules and agreements could, however, perhaps be struck in
order to circumvent this problem.experimentation in this regard. This is “accountability“ as it can and should be
operationalized: prescriptive as to ends but not to means.
Ranking Programs, Targeting the Money
Another option that is somewhat similar to giving the money to students is to
transfer money to departments — or faculties, schools, or even institutions as a
whole — according to the adjudged quality of their graduate programs. Better
programs would receive more money, which would give them the means to grow
and otherwise finance their programs. Such a system could, theoretically, again
result in a set of incentives where quality was rewarded and better-quality
programs could grow.
Such a “ranking-based“ approach would avoid the problem mentioned above
of schools competing for students with financial awards that essentially
diminished the net value of the transfers since the money would not be attached
to students. It would also be superior to the student-targeted system if the ranking
scheme used was better at identifying quality graduate programs than students
were when making their enrolment decisions. In particular, such a ranking scheme
could take future plans for change and improvement into account in a way that
students’ current choices might not, thus opening up the transfer system to
emerging and innovative programs more than a system based on past
performance might do.
The greatest challenge to such a system, however, would be to devise an
effective and efficient ranking scheme that accurately gauged the quality of
graduate programs. Where such schemes have been tried, they have been neither
popular nor particularly successful — Great Britain being the leading case in
point. The ranking has been laborious, time-consuming, and controversial, and it
has ultimately not done resulted in much differentiation of programs. For these
reasons, the student-based transfer system is likely the better option.
Increasing Research Money
Given that research and graduate training can be complementary, especially at the
doctoral level, another means of increasing the capacity and improving the quality
of graduate education would be to put more money into research. This could also
help address demand-side problems by helping students fund their studies and
otherwise making graduate school more attractive if some of this funding found
its way into students’ pockets in the form of research assistantships or other forms
of remuneration.
Such benefits could, furthermore, be strengthened if more emphasis were put
on funding the training of graduate students in the awarding of research monies.
And one undeniable advantage of the enhanced-research-money approach is that
it would be fairly easy to implement since various systems for awarding research
grants are already in place, and individual research grants could lead to the
financing of a number of graduate students and otherwise help the system grow
more than awarding funds one student at a time.
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overall graduate education strategy. One limitation of this approach, however, is
that increased research funding would, by definition, do less to expand an
institution’s course offerings, the number of professors, and other non-research
components of the educational experience since research grants are awarded first
and foremost according to the proposed research plan rather than the benefits it
might have for graduate student education per se. Similarly, whereas in many
cases, research and graduate education are integrally related, there are many good
graduate programs in places where relatively little research goes on (especially at
the master’s level, where research is less important), and these would not benefit
from such a system. 
In other words, if the goals of government are to improve the quality of
graduate school education or to expand programs, money spent directly on these
goals will likely yield greater results per dollar than will the spin-off benefits of
putting more money into research, significant as those might be. 
Coping with the Influx
Expanding graduate education is easier said than done. And as noted at the
beginning of this paper, there will be some significant cost and resource
implications, even if the basic problems with incentives can be solved. 
In the present model of instruction, graduate students are accorded intensive
amounts of faculty time, and thus are a major draw on resources. It is in large part
this intensity that will lead to billions of dollars in increased instructional costs for
universities. It therefore seems likely that at least one part of the solution to coping
with the coming influx of graduate students will be to reduce the per-student cost
of providing graduate education. Indeed, many such changes have already been
making their way into the system since the pressure on costs generated by the
reductions in government support for postsecondary education in general in the
1990s; with the additional pressures that will be generated by the planned or
desired expansions, we are likely to see more. This is simply a descriptive
statement, not a prescriptive one.
There are some obvious ways to reduce the cost of educating graduate
students. Classes can become larger, thus reducing unit costs. More intensive
programs of study — such as full thesis options (especially at the master’s level)
— can be reduced in favour of cheaper course-based options. Professors involved
in teaching graduate students could have their undergraduate teaching loads
decreased or eliminated, and their undergraduate duties taken over by lower-paid,
non-research faculty — or even by graduate students themselves. 
None of these ideas are new, of course; indeed, all of them were used to
decrease unit costs at the undergraduate level with the massification of first-
degree programs during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. But that process is widely
judged to have been a traumatic one that led to widespread falls in the quality of
education. It is unclear, however, whether or not such declines in quality truly
occurred, since quality has not, in general, been well enough defined and the
measurement of quality — or any changes in it — has not been done rigorously
enough to show how the quality of the educational experience actually changed.
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be minimized during the transition to a perhaps necessarily somewhat more
“massified“ system of graduate education. Extensive research and careful analysis
will need to be brought to bear on the question of how to maintain or —
preferably — enhance educational quality while unit costs are being reduced
because of the pressures we have referred to. At a minimum, this will require the
measurement and monitoring of learning conditions, environments, and outcomes
through instruments similar to the National Survey of Student Engagement
(NSSE) and the College Learning Assessment (CLA), adapted to graduate schools.
Such changes at the graduate level are of course likely to have knock-on effects
on undergraduate education. Because of the cost pressures from the expansion of
the graduate system, undergraduates will, for example, probably find themselves
in larger classes and will come into contact with tenured faculty less often and
receive more instruction from graduate students or teaching-only faculty. It is
possible, of course, that such changes may be blessings in disguise: it may, for
instance, be found that teaching-only faculty are better instructors at the
undergraduate level than their more research-intensive colleagues. But again, this
will be determined only by constant and vigilant monitoring of changes in
learning environments and outputs.
Perhaps a more serious effect at the undergraduate level is the potential
erosion — or perceived erosion — of the value of the undergraduate degree as
higher degrees become more common and as increasing numbers of employers
begin demanding the higher credential. As we noted at the beginning of this
paper, pressures are at the same time likely to mount for increases in tuition fees to
help defray the massive increase in the expenditures that will be necessary to
enlarge the graduate-level education system along the lines contemplated — these
tuition increases coming alongside any increases in government funding and any
reductions in unit costs that may be achieved. Yet the changes in the nature of
undergraduate education along the lines just discussed pose a serious challenge
for such “enhanced revenue generation.“
At present, in most disciplines, undergraduates partially subsidize graduate
students. Though neither comes close to paying the full costs of their education
through their tuition fees, undergraduates certainly pay a far larger proportion of
their costs than graduate students. If one consequence of increased graduate
enrolment is a real or apparent decline in educational quality or relative declines
in long-term earnings because of the credential inflation just outlined, then
undergraduates may object even more vociferously to paying higher tuition fees
— effectively in order to subsidize graduate education. As a result, a substantial
share of the cost burden for graduate education may in fact necessarily revert to
graduate students themselves.
None of these factors are reasons, in themselves, to dissuade us of the need to
raise enrolment — or improve the quality of instruction — at the graduate level.
The purpose of this discussion is merely to make the point that the expansion of
graduate education is unlikely to be painless. It will entail significant cost
increases, and to the extent that these increases cannot be borne through public
funding, it may cause potentially wrenching shifts in universities. It is imperative
that the system — from the top down — be prepared to cope with these pressures
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educational quality at the undergraduate level. As much as the financial challenge
of finding spaces for graduate students, we face the challenge of managing the full
set of pressures and changes likely to be set into motion by these developments.
Conclusion
In this paper we have noted the following:
￿ The demands of the new “knowledge economy“ require an increasing
number of highly skilled workers; this in turn is driving policymakers to
look at ways of increasing the number of people acquiring graduate
degrees.
￿ Graduate education is expensive; considerably more so than
undergraduate education. Rough calculations suggest that a doubling of
graduate school enrolment in Canada might create an increase in costs on
the order of $5 billion annually.
￿ An effective strategy for increasing enrolment at the graduate level will
require that both demand- and supply-side issues be addressed.
￿ On the demand side, the student loan system should be changed to
accommodate the special needs of graduate students. Changes should
include a widening of eligibility and a rise in loan limits. Grants,
scholarships, bursaries, and other forms of non-repayable support should
also be modified — and in many cases increased — in order to make
graduate education an affordable and a worthwhile investment,
particularly in a context where many potential students can earn decent
money without going further in their studies. Such awards will almost
surely need to vary by discipline, reflecting differences in schooling costs,
alternative employment opportunities, and the social and economic value
of the schooling.
￿ An expansion of graduate education — or improvements in its quality —
are unlikely to be achieved unless the supply-side is also addressed,
particularly in terms of finding the most effective means of getting money
into the hands of institutions in a manner that best achieves the twin goals
relating to expansion and quality. The most obvious and traditional means
of doing that is to increase transfers from the federal government to the
provincial governments or from governments to institutions. But while
such initiatives will undoubtedly have positive effects, they offer few
guarantees that the money will be spent in the best way to achieve the
desired ends: improved quality and an expanded system.
￿ An alternative option is to attach funding directly to students. One possible
broad model for doing this is that of the Russian GIFO system, which
grants variable subsidies according to merit, the largest subsidies being
granted to the best students. This would create incentives for institutions to
improve the quality of their programs as they compete for the better
students while also providing them with the means to expand.
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education is likely to generate significant financial pressures on the system
and consequently lead to changes in the delivery — and price — of
university education at both the graduate and undergraduate levels. Great
care will need to be taken to ensure that these changes are made in as
informed a manner as possible; there will be a need for more measurement
and monitoring of quality, and there should be a commitment to
maintaining quality at the highest level that is possible — given these
pressures. After all, it will be of dubious benefit to expand the number of
graduate students out of concern that we need a larger supply of very
highly qualified workers if the quality of those graduates declines as a
result. 
The expansion of graduate education in Canada promises to be an important,
large, and complex undertaking. With wisely chosen policy initiatives, the desired
expansion can be achieved, access to all qualified applicants can be ensured,
quality can be preserved or even enhanced, and universities can be provided with
the incentives and means to generally put students’ interests at the heart of their
enterprise. While challenging in many ways, the general solution is at least
conceptually a simple matter of paying attention to both the supply and demand
sides of the problem; establishing effective incentives, including the structure of
financing at the individual, governmental, and institutional levels; and monitoring
quality so as to inform decisions and the evaluation of outcomes as effectively as
possible.
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